Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1983

Travelers Express Company, Inc., A Minnesota
Corporation v. State of Utah, Linn C. Baker, In His
Capacity As Treasurer of The State of Utah, And
Richard G. Jensen, In His Capacity As Auditor of
The State of Utah : Brief of Defendants-Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and Joseph P. McCarthy; Attorneys for
Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Travelers Express v. Utah, No. 19216 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4131

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY,
INC., a Minnesota corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

-v-

CASE NO. 19216

STATE OF UTAH, LINN C. BAKER,
in his capacity as Treasurer of
the State of Utah, and RICHARD
G. JENSEN, in his capacity as
auditor of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
L. RIDD LARSON
DOUGLAS MATSU MORI
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Desert Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent

F J LED
,lllil

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY,
INC., a Minnesota corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

-v-

CASE NO. 19216

STATE OF UTAH, LINN C. BAKER,
in his capacity as Treasurer of
the State of Utah, and RICHARD
G. JENSEN, in his capacity as
auditor of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
L. RIDD LARSON
DOUGLAS MATSU MORI
PAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Desert Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

nISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATtMENT OF FACTS.

1

ARGUMENT.

2

POINT I

POINT II

THE UTAH DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY ACT WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT
LOSS TO THE OWNER OF PROPERTY IN THE
CUSTODY OF OTHERS. • • . • • •

2

THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IS
INAPPLICABLE • • • • • • • • • • •

4

POINT III RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION COMPEL
THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH DISPOSITION
OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT TO THIS CASE

5

SuMMARY ·AND CONCLUSION • • . • • • • • . . . • • • • • • 13

( i)

CASE CITED
f)at~m;;in

J22 P. 2d 381.

v, )2oai;:d Qf

.

!:trnturn y,

153 P. 2d 941.

T~rr

l,

.

f;xam~n~i;s,

7 Utah 2d 221,

.

107 Utah 2d 340,

7

Conover v, f!d, Qf Education of Nebo Sch, Dist,,
110 Utah 4564, 175 P.2d 202, reh. den. k86 P.2d 588 •

6

Del Monte CQrp, y, Moore, 580 P.2d 24 (Utah).

4

Dougl;;is Aircraft CQ, v, Cranston, 374 P.2d
(Cal), 98 A. L.R. 2d 298 • • • • •

4, 9

Gord v, Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138,
434 P.2d 449.
• •••••.•

6

Grant y, Utah State Land BQard, 26 Utah 2d 100,

485 P. 2d 1035 • • • • • • • • •

6

In re Ut;;ih Savings & LQan Ass'n,, 21 Utah 2d 169,
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

7

In the Matter of the Est;;ite of Buffi,
(1977). • . • • • • • • •

12

442 p. 2d 92 9.

354, 564 P.2d 150
No.

6

Continent;;il Tel, Co, y, State T;;ix Comm,,
• • • • • •
. • • •

53 9 P. 2 d 4 4 7 (Utah)

819

7

98 Idaho

In the Matter Qf the Estate of LQuis A, GrQsser,
18075, January 14, 1983.
• • • • • • •
Ireland y, MackintQsh,

61 Pac 901 (Utah)

12

• • •

4

Masich y, U,S, Smelting, Rfg, & Min, Co,, 113
Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, app. dism. 335 U.S. 866, reh.
den. 335 U.S. 905 • . • . • • •
• • • • • • • •

6

(ii)

Pacific Intermountain Express v, State Tax Comm,,
7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549, • • •
. •••••
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. y. Dept. of Revenue.
481 P. 2d 556 (Wash.). • • • • •
• • • • . • . .

7, b

Ralph Child Const. Co. v. State Tax Comm .•
12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 • • • • .
• •••
Smith y.

Am·

Packing, 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951

south Carolina Tax Comm. v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co.,
221 S.E.2d 522 • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Treasurer and Receiver General v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co..
446 N.E. 2d 1376. • • . .

9, 11

STATUTES CITED
Section 78-44-1, et seq. U.C.A. 1953.
section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 • • • • •
Section 78-44-2, u.c.A. 1953 • • • • •
,
See Statutes of Limitations 63 Harvard Law
Review 1177 • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • •

(iii)

l

2
2

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory
J''Jgment

to determine whether it was required to file information

required by the Treasurer under the Utah Unclaimed Property Act
and to pay over amounts claimed by the Treasurer for uncashed
money orders issued by Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court in
favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant on cross motions for
.summary judgment, defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and judgment
in favor of Defendants as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff issues money orders throughout the United
States.

Some money orders issued in Utah are never cashed.

The

Treasurer of the State of Utah claimed that under the Utah
Unclaimed Property Act

l

plaintiff had a duty to file reports

concerning these funds and to pay funds over to the Treasurer.
Plaintiff filed reports and paid funds to the Treasurer under an
agreement which preserved plaintiff's right to file an action to
1.

Section 78-44-1, et seq. U.C.A. 1953

-1-

determine whether it had a duty to file reports and to pa}

Lr,r·-

funds to the Treasurer.

L)

Plaintiff claimed that under the s
2

year statute of limitations , the rights of the payee-0Y1ner

0 ,,_

extinguished and consequently there is no "sum payable" sevPr'
years after the money order was issued which could be "presurr,e.c
abandoned" after seven years at which time plaintiff
3
to file its report with the Treasurer.

woula ha•:t

The parties stipulated that the sole question involved
is whether the six year limitation precludes the Treasurer fro[
requiring reports and transfer of funds under the Utah Act.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
ACT WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT LOSS TO THE OWNER
OF PROPERTY IN THE CUSTODY OF OTHERS BY
PUBLIC OR CORPORATE ESCHEAT.
Prior to the enactment of the Utah Unclaimed Property
Act, unclaimed property escheated to the State. One of the
purposes the Legislature had in mind in adopting the Act was to
prevent forefeiture of the owner's property.

In general this

purpose is accomplished by requiring the person in possession of
such property to transfer possession to the Treasurer who has a
duty to try to locate the owner.

2.
3.

The owner's right to recover

Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953
Section 78-44-2, U.C.A. 1953

-2-

his property from the Treasurer is not time limited and an
pc:clieat does not occur.

The Treasurer contends that the Utah Act

, en•Gves limitations periods which might otherwise have been
a['plicable between the owner and the person in possession of the
~£operty

in cases covered by the statute.
The Act was intended to prevent forfeiture by private

escheat or unjust enrichment of a person or entity in possession
which has no equitable claim to funds or property in its
possession merely because the owner had failed to demand payment
within the six year period.
The Treasurer contends that Plaintiff and other
entities which issue money orders or similar instruments have no
equitable claim to funds which remain in possession when a money
order is not presented for payment.

At the time the money order

is issued, the owner pays all of the money (and perhaps a fee as
well) to the issuer which it will be required to pay at some
future date.

The issuer receives income from investment of funds

received for money orders until the money order is presented for
payment.
Section 78-48-8 in the Act as it was passed in 1957
covered" ••• all intangible property ••• " not otherwise covered in
the Act. In 1959 the legislature specifically included the term
"money order."

-3-

It is clear that the 1959 amendment evidenced the
Legislature's intent that the six year limitation not apply.
The Legislature intended that from the time of
abandonment until the owner is located that all of the people
through the Uniform School Fund, not the entity, have the use anc
benefit of this property.

It further determined that transfer

of

funds to the Treasurer would relieve the person in possession
from any liability to the owner.
POINT II
THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IS
IN APPL !CABLE
Some cases have held that a limitation of action
4

peri~

not only bars the remedy but bars the right as well.
The
5
6
hold that statutes of
general rule and later case law
.limitation are procedural bars only and the legislature has the

power to extend the period as to causes of action that have not
been time barred by the effective date of the limitation period.
The Treasurer does not claim that the legislature can
constitutionally revive causes of action that have been time
barred by then applicable statutes of limitations.

7

4. Ireland y, Mackintosh, 61 Pac 901 (Utah)
5. See Statutes of Limitations 63 Harvard Law
Review 1177
6. Del Monte Corp. y. Moore. 580 P,2d 24 (Utah)
7, Douglas Aircraft Co. y. Cranston, 374 P,2d
819 (Cal), 98 A.L.R, 2d 298.
-4-

The basic question is only whether the Utah Legislature
intended to effect a change in the rights of the owner and issuer
Pither as a change in the law of property or in the limitation
period applicable.

Under the commonly accepted rules of

statutory construction the Treasurer submits that the intent of
the Legislature was to change the limitation period for otherwise
the Act could never become effective.
Plaintiff may argue that the six year limitation
permits it to refuse payment to all of its customers who present
muney orders for payment after six years.

It would seem that

this position has not been taken as a matter of actual practice
hy Plaintiff.

What is clear is that Plaintiff cannot waive the

statute for customers and at the same time urge the statute
against the Treasurer under the Act.

8

POINT III
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION COMPEL THE
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH DISPOSITION OF
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT TO THIS CASE.
There are many rules for construing statutes, and all
of these rules are merely aids to the court to determine what a

8. South Carolina Tax Comm. y. Metropolitan Life
lns. Co .• 221 S.E.2d 522

-5-

legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted or amended

0

statute.
A statute carries with it a presumption that it is
valid and that words and phrases were chosen advisedly to exprcE·
9
the legislative intent.
The court does not look to correlat 10 r,
or arrangment of words alone but may look to reason, spirit and
sense of the legislation as indicated by the entire context and
10
subject matter of statutes dealing with the subject.
The court
should give an act such a construction as will accomplish its
11
purpose.
A statute must be construed with reference to the
12
objects sought to be accomplished by it.
Where there is doubt
or uncertainty concerning interpretation and applicable of
statutes, they should be reviewed in light of the conditions and
necessities which they are intended to meet and objectives sought
13
to be obtained thereby.
When a statute has been enacted for a particular
purpose and another statute has been enacted at another time for

9. Gord y. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449.
10. Masich y. U.S. Smelting. Rfg. & Min. Co,, 113 Utah 101,
191 P.2d 612, app. dism. 335 U.S. 866, reh. den. 335 U.S. 905.
11. Ralph Child Const. Co. y. State Tax Comm.,
12 Utah 2d
53, 362 P.2d 422.
12. Conover y. Bd. of Education of Nebo Sch. Dist .• 110
Utah 4564, 175 P.2d 202, reh. den. k86 P.2d 588.
13. Continental Tel. Co. y. State Tax Comm,,
53 9 P. 2d 44'
(Utah); Grant y. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P. 7d
1035.

-6-

a different purpose and there is apparent conflict, the statutes
,,hr>uld

be looked at together with a view to reconciling apparent

lict and giving each statute its intended effect insofar as
14
possible without nullifying the other.
r:orif

A preference should be given to latter statutes over
15
prior ones where there is a conflict.
The latter statute is
16
controlling.
The legislature does not intend to do a vain and
17
useless act.
The Treasurer submits that the Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act was intended to be a remedial act.

The intention

was to require the holder of the abandoned property to report to
the Treasurer such property and to pay it over to the Treasurer
in accordance with the terms of the Act.

It would be a vain and

useless act to require a holder of property to report on and pay
over such property to the Treasurer at any time after the six
year statute had run if it intended to terminate the right or the
right of action of the owner and vest the right or prevent anyone

14. In re Utah Sayings & Loan Ass'n .• 21 Utah 2d 169, 442
P.2d 929; Chaturn y. Terrl, 107 Utah 2d 340, 153 P.2d 941; .5..m..il.h
y, Am. Packing. 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951.
15. Bateman y. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d
381.

16. Pacific Intermountain Express y. State Tax Comm .• 7 Utah
2r1 15, 316 P.2d 549.
17. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. y. Dept. of Revenue. 481
f'.2d 556 (Wash.).
-7-

from exercising a claim or right on behalf of the owner against
the holder.
The six year statute has been Utah law as to written
contracts since at least 1900.

The Act became law in 1957.

Tnc

only reasonable construction which will give both statutes eftec:
without nullifying the Act is to construe the six year statute ts
remain effective

~

as it is modified by the Act.

Giving

this construction allows both statutes to have maximum effect.
As applied to property subject to the Act, the limitation is
extended as to all deposits, bank accounts, life insurance
proceeds and money orders and other property subject to the Act.
If the construction urged by plaintiff were to be adopted, the
property would never be turned over to the State Treasurer, a
result obviously not intended by the Act.
Defendants are aware that there are decisions contrary
to their po si ti on.

For example, Washington has construed its act
18
to allow the construction sought by the plaintiff.
However,
its Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that since the
Washington Act eventually provided for escheat, the right of the
Department was derivative from the owner, and since the owner
cut off, the state was likewise cut off.

The Department by

regulation could not set aside the limitation applying to the

18.
supra,

Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. y. Dept. of Revenue,

-8-

waE

···"'If

and the legislature which did not enact Section 16 of the

un1forn1

Act nor later amend the Act to include Section 16 as

urged by the Department did not intend otherwise.

The majority

acknowledged that the Uniform Act (like Utah's Act) has
eliminated escheat.
of

The three dissenting justices, applying some

the rules of construction above, held that Section 16 was not

nteded, and that the legislative intent in adopting the statutory
plan was clear.

The dissenters also thought that escheat, when

the claimant had died and there was no one else who could make
claims to the assets, was not significant.
While the California Act apparently contained Section
16 of the Uniform Act, the Supreme Court held that the section

did not operate retroactively to revive cases already barred by
the statute of limitations.

19

It did hold that claims not

barred by the effective date of the Act were subject to the
provisions of the Act.
On March 11, 1983 (after this case was argued below)
the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Treasurer and Receiver
20
In that
General y. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.
case John Hancock made essentially the same argument that
Plaintiff makes in this case.

It argued that the six year

Douglas Aircraft Co. Inc. y. Alan
374 P.2d 819.
20. 446 N.E.2d 1376
19.

~(anston.

-9-

statute precluded that need to report property in its possess,cr.
since the property was not "abandoned property"at the end of the
ten or fourteen year dormancy period in effect in 1980.
Massachusetts court answered this argument as follows:
The Legislature could not have meant to
allow statutes of limitations governing the
various types of property defined as
abandoned in G.L. c. 200A, §§1-6, to
determine randomly the scope of the abandoned ·
property law. Most typical statues of
limitations are shorter than the ten or the
fourteen year dormancy periods in effet under
the abandoned property and unclaimed funds
laws. If John Hancock's argument were to
prevail, no type of abandoned property
subject to a typical statute of limitations
could ever be collected by the Treasurer.
Thus, John Hancock's construction of the
statute would render the statute difficult,
if not impossible, to enforce. It also would
create a situation in which the purposes of
the abandoned property act, to reunite the
property with its owners and to employ the
property for public purposes in the interim,
could not be achieved.
"An intention to
enact a barren and ineffective provision is
not lightly to be imputed to the
Legislature." Insurance Rating Bd. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 189, 248
N.E.2d 500 (1969). Therefore, we read §7(c)
as applying only to that property for which
the statute of limitations had expired as of
the effective date of St. 1950, c. 801.
Under this interpretation, the purpose of
§7(c) was to require only prospective
reporting of abandoned property. in this
way, no person or entity who had relied on
the use of the funds after expiration of a
statute of limitations and before passage of
St.1950, c. 801, would be disadvantaged.
This interpretation is further supported by
the repeal of this version of §7(c) in 1975,
because that section had become an

-10-

The

unnecessary anachronism by then.
21
1975, c. 277, §4.

See St.

The Court also held that
In addition, the concept of a statute of
limitations is autithetical to the purposes
of the abandoned property act. If we adopted
John Hancock's construction of the statute,
we would permit every entity to make a selfserving interpretation of the abandoned
property and unclaimed funds laws, and to
use that interpretation to its benefit by
failing to report such property and barring
any later enforcement action by a statute of
limitations. We are unwilling to attribute
to the Legislature an intent to grant
unfettered discretion to the holders of
abandoned property to determine what property
must be reported, and therefore what property
is owed to the Commonwealth. We affirm the
judge's ruling that no statute of limiations
bars the Treasurer's action against John
22
Hancock.
It is respectfully submitted that while the Utah Act is
based on the Uniform Act, but omitting Section 16, the Court
should construe the Utah Act in a manner that will give the
effect to the legislation that was intended by the Legislature.
The Treasurer submit that the view of the Massachusetts Court is
a for more reasonable interpretation than is that of the
Washington Court (4-3 decision).
21.
22.

446 N.E.2d 1376, 1380-1381
446 N.E.2d 1376, 1381-1382

-11-

~i::gssei;

valid.

23

This court held

In the Mattei;: Qf tbe i;;:;;tgte Qf Louis},_._

that a will witnessed by a 16 year old boy in 1974

was

The Uniform Probate Code, adopted thereafter, in Section

75-2-505(1) required a witness to be 18.

Section 75-8-101(2)(a)

provides that the Utah Uniform Probate Code takes effect on
July 1, 1977, and applied to all wills of decedents dying
thereafter.

Grosser died on April 17, 1981.

Section 75-2-506

provides that a will is valid if at the time of making the
execution complies with the law of the place where the will is
executed.

This language was held to be broad enough to include
24
wills executed in Utah. In the Matter of the Estate of Buffl,
the Idaho Supreme Court construed I.e. Section 15-2-506
(identical to Section 75-2-506) as a section only to cover wills
made in other jurisdictions, and not to be used to validate Idaho
wills.

Justice Howe, speaking for a unanimious court said, "

We will not lightly ascribe an interpretation which will produce
such an incongruous result.

Furthermore, we are hesitant to

assume that the Legislature, in adopting the Uniform Probate
Code, intended to invalidate wills which had been properly made
under prior law in this state."
Acts based on Uniform Acts, like any other acts of the
Legislature should be construed to make sense.

23.
24.

No. 18075, January 14, 1983
98 Idaho 354, 564 P.2d 150 (1977)
-12-

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Treasurer prays the Court to reverse the decision
of the District Court and to declare as a matter of law that the
utal1 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act applied to all
property described in the statutes in the possession of the
plaintiff on the effective date of the Act and for six years
p1ior thereto.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. MC CARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
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